feat(webapp): enforce scopes for environment API keys - #4389
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WalkthroughAdds additional API-key resolution with feature-flag controls, RBAC abilities, telemetry, restricted-key handling, and scoped authentication across API routes. Batch operations gain task-aware authorization, parent-run checks, scoped idempotency keys, and public access token headers. Run authorization and related-run presentation are updated, while SDK schemas and helpers support unique task identifiers. Extensive tests cover authentication, authorization, JWT handling, batch behavior, and feature controls. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
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apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts (1)
215-215: 🔒 Security & Privacy | 🟠 Major | 🏗️ Heavy liftRestore authorization for related-run projections.
Removing
RbacAbilityand mapping every embedded root, parent, and child run can expose out-of-scope run data to additional keys.createCommonRunStructureincludestaskIdentifier, idempotency key, tags, metadata, batch ID, and trigger details. Preserve related-run summaries, but filter them using the caller’s ability or return a minimal policy-approved projection; add a regression test covering an out-of-scope child run.Also applies to: 292-304
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apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.tsapps/webapp/test/apiRetrieveRunPresenter.readroute.test.ts
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- apps/webapp/test/apiRetrieveRunPresenter.readroute.test.ts
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- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (11, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (4, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (9, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (5, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (7, 12)
- GitHub Check: sdk-compat / Node.js 20.20 (warp-ubuntu-latest-x64-4x)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (10, 12)
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- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (3, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (12, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (6, 12)
- GitHub Check: webapp / 🧪 Unit Tests: Webapp (2, 12)
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- GitHub Check: sdk-compat / Node.js 24.18 (warp-ubuntu-latest-x64-4x)
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🧰 Additional context used
📓 Path-based instructions (8)
**/*.{ts,tsx}
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
**/*.{ts,tsx}: Use types over interfaces for TypeScript
Avoid using enums; prefer string unions or const objects instead
**/*.{ts,tsx}: Prefer static imports over dynamicimport(); use dynamic imports only for unresolvable circular dependencies, genuine performance code splitting, or conditional runtime loading.
Import Trigger.dev tasks from@trigger.dev/sdk; never use@trigger.dev/sdk/v3or deprecatedclient.defineJob.
Add agentcrumbs while writing code using approved namespaces; mark lines with//@Crumbsor blocks with `// `#region` `@crumbs, and strip them before merging.
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
{packages/core,apps/webapp}/**/*.{ts,tsx}
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
Use zod for validation in packages/core and apps/webapp
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx}
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (.github/copilot-instructions.md)
Use function declarations instead of default exports
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
**/*.ts
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (.cursor/rules/otel-metrics.mdc)
**/*.ts: When creating or editing OTEL metrics (counters, histograms, gauges), ensure metric attributes have low cardinality by using only enums, booleans, bounded error codes, or bounded shard IDs
Do not use high-cardinality attributes in OTEL metrics such as UUIDs/IDs (envId, userId, runId, projectId, organizationId), unbounded integers (itemCount, batchSize, retryCount), timestamps (createdAt, startTime), or free-form strings (errorMessage, taskName, queueName)
When exporting OTEL metrics via OTLP to Prometheus, be aware that the exporter automatically adds unit suffixes to metric names (e.g., 'my_duration_ms' becomes 'my_duration_ms_milliseconds', 'my_counter' becomes 'my_counter_total'). Account for these transformations when writing Grafana dashboards or Prometheus queries
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
apps/webapp/**/*.{ts,tsx}
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (.cursor/rules/webapp.mdc)
apps/webapp/**/*.{ts,tsx}: Access environment variables through theenvexport ofenv.server.tsinstead of directly accessingprocess.env
Use subpath exports from@trigger.dev/corepackage instead of importing from the root@trigger.dev/corepathDo not reintroduce the removed v1 execution path;
RunEngineVersion.V1branches may only reject or finalize gracefully so v3 clients receive a clean 4xx, never a 5xx.
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
apps/**/*.{ts,tsx}
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (AGENTS.md)
For apps, use
typecheckfor verification and never usebuildas the correctness check.
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
apps/webapp/app/**/*.{ts,tsx}
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (apps/webapp/CLAUDE.md)
apps/webapp/app/**/*.{ts,tsx}: For dashboard changes, visually verify the running Remix app with Chrome DevTools MCP, using snapshots, screenshots, interaction, and console-message checks as appropriate.
UseuseCallbackanduseMemoonly for context provider values, expensive derived data used as a dependency, or stable references required by dependency arrays; do not wrap ordinary event handlers or trivial computations.
Use named constants for sentinel or placeholder values instead of scattering raw string literals across comparisons.
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
apps/webapp/app/**/*.ts
📄 CodeRabbit inference engine (apps/webapp/CLAUDE.md)
apps/webapp/app/**/*.ts: Never userequest.signalto detect client disconnects. UsegetRequestAbortSignal()fromapp/services/httpAsyncStorage.server.ts, which is wired to Express response close events.
Access environment variables through theenvexport fromapp/env.server.ts; never useprocess.envdirectly.
Always use PrismafindFirstinstead offindUnique.
Always use the$transactionhelper from~/db.server, never callprisma.$transactionor$replica.$transactiondirectly. Pass isolation levels as strings, useSerializablefor correctness-critical read-then-write invariants, and guard possibly undefined helper results when a definite value is required.
Files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
🧠 Learnings (15)
📚 Learning: 2026-02-06T19:53:38.843Z
Learnt from: 0ski
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 2994
File: apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/DeploymentListPresenter.server.ts:233-237
Timestamp: 2026-02-06T19:53:38.843Z
Learning: When constructing Vercel dashboard URLs from deployment IDs, always strip the dpl_ prefix from the ID. Implement this by transforming the ID with .replace(/^dpl_/, "") before concatenating into the URL: https://vercel.com/${teamSlug}/${projectName}/${cleanedDeploymentId}. Consider centralizing this logic in a small helper (e.g., getVercelDeploymentId(id) or a URL builder) and add tests to verify both prefixed and non-prefixed inputs.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-03-22T13:26:12.060Z
Learnt from: ericallam
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3244
File: apps/webapp/app/components/code/TextEditor.tsx:81-86
Timestamp: 2026-03-22T13:26:12.060Z
Learning: In the triggerdotdev/trigger.dev codebase, do not flag `navigator.clipboard.writeText(...)` calls for `missing-await`/`unhandled-promise` issues. These clipboard writes are intentionally invoked without `await` and without `catch` handlers across the project; keep that behavior consistent when reviewing TypeScript/TSX files (e.g., usages like in `apps/webapp/app/components/code/TextEditor.tsx`).
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-03-22T19:24:14.403Z
Learnt from: matt-aitken
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3187
File: apps/webapp/app/v3/services/alerts/deliverErrorGroupAlert.server.ts:200-204
Timestamp: 2026-03-22T19:24:14.403Z
Learning: In the triggerdotdev/trigger.dev codebase, webhook URLs are not expected to contain embedded credentials/secrets (e.g., fields like `ProjectAlertWebhookProperties` should only hold credential-free webhook endpoints). During code review, if you see logging or inclusion of raw webhook URLs in error messages, do not automatically treat it as a credential-leak/secrets-in-logs issue by default—first verify the URL does not contain embedded credentials (for example, no username/password in the URL, no obvious secret/token query params or fragments). If the URL is credential-free per this project’s conventions, allow the logging.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-05-18T08:21:27.694Z
Learnt from: d-cs
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3632
File: apps/webapp/sentry.server.ts:4-21
Timestamp: 2026-05-18T08:21:27.694Z
Learning: When handling Prisma error P1001 ("Can't reach database server") in TypeScript, don’t assume a single error shape. Prisma can surface P1001 via two different error classes/fields: `PrismaClientKnownRequestError` exposes it as `err.code === "P1001"` (common during mid-query connection drops), while `PrismaClientInitializationError` exposes it as `err.errorCode === "P1001"` (common on client startup failure). Therefore, predicates should use `err.code === "P1001" || err.errorCode === "P1001"`. Do not flag `err.code === "P1001"` as “unreachable/never matches,” as it is expected in production.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-05-18T08:21:27.694Z
Learnt from: d-cs
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3632
File: apps/webapp/sentry.server.ts:4-21
Timestamp: 2026-05-18T08:21:27.694Z
Learning: When handling Prisma errors for P1001 ("Can't reach database server"), do not assume it only appears under a single property name. Prisma may surface P1001 via either `PrismaClientKnownRequestError` (`err.code === "P1001"`, e.g., mid-query connection drops) or `PrismaClientInitializationError` (`err.errorCode === "P1001"`, e.g., client startup connection failure). To reliably detect the condition, check `err.code === "P1001" || err.errorCode === "P1001"`, and avoid review rules that would incorrectly flag `err.code === "P1001"` as unreachable/never-matching.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-13T19:53:13.759Z
Learnt from: ericallam
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3937
File: packages/trigger-sdk/skills/realtime-and-frontend/SKILL.md:258-260
Timestamp: 2026-06-13T19:53:13.759Z
Learning: When reviewing code that uses `trigger.dev/react-hooks`’s `useRealtimeRun`, preserve the call signature where the first argument is the full realtime handle object (not `handle.id`). This is intentional to maintain type-safety and is consistent with the official docs; do not suggest changing the first argument from the handle object to `handle.id`.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-17T17:13:49.929Z
Learnt from: matt-aitken
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3948
File: apps/webapp/app/routes/_app.orgs.$organizationSlug.projects.$projectParam.env.$envParam.bulk-actions.$bulkActionParam/route.tsx:48-62
Timestamp: 2026-06-17T17:13:49.929Z
Learning: In triggerdotdev/trigger.dev, within `dashboardLoader`/`dashboardAction` (or similar context resolver code) whenever you resolve an organization ID from an organization slug for RBAC/enterprise authorization scope, always read from the primary Prisma client (`prisma`), not `$replica`. Using `$replica` can hit replica-lag and cause the RBAC lookup/authorization to run without the correct org scope (bypassing intended role enforcement). Implement the slug→org lookup with `prisma.organization.findFirst(...)` (or equivalent primary-client query) and add an inline comment documenting why the primary client is required (replica lag could lead to unscoped RBAC checks).
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-23T13:04:21.413Z
Learnt from: carderne
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 4023
File: apps/webapp/app/services/upsertBranch.server.ts:14-18
Timestamp: 2026-06-23T13:04:21.413Z
Learning: In TypeScript, it’s valid to `import { type X }` and then use `typeof X` in a type-only position, e.g. `type Alias = z.infer<typeof X>`. The `type` modifier suppresses the runtime import, but the type checker still has the full exported type so `z.infer<typeof X>` can resolve correctly. In code reviews, don’t flag this as a TypeScript compile error as long as `typeof X` is used in a type context (e.g., with `z.infer`, `type` aliases, generics), not as a runtime value.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-05-05T09:38:02.512Z
Learnt from: d-cs
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3523
File: apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v3.batches.ts:178-181
Timestamp: 2026-05-05T09:38:02.512Z
Learning: When reviewing code that catches `ServiceValidationError` in `*.server.ts` files, do not blindly forward `error.status` to HTTP responses, because SVEs may be thrown with non-default statuses (e.g., 400/500) and forwarding them can cause client-visible behavioral regressions (e.g., surfacing 500s to clients). Prefer a safe default response status of `error.status ?? 422`, but only after confirming via the reachable call graph that the caught `ServiceValidationError` instances are expected to carry those non-default statuses; otherwise, normalize to `422` to avoid unexpected client-visible 5xx behavior.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-05-12T21:04:05.815Z
Learnt from: ericallam
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3542
File: apps/webapp/app/components/sessions/v1/SessionStatus.tsx:1-3
Timestamp: 2026-05-12T21:04:05.815Z
Learning: In this Remix + TypeScript codebase, do not flag a server/client boundary violation when a file imports only types from a module matching `*.server`.
Specifically, it’s safe to import types using `import type { Foo } from "*.server"` or `import { type Foo } from "*.server"` because TypeScript erases type-only imports at compile time and they emit no JavaScript, so they won’t cross the Remix server/client bundle boundary.
Only raise the boundary concern for value imports (e.g., `import { Foo }` without `type`, or `import Foo`), since those produce JavaScript output.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-25T18:21:51.905Z
Learnt from: carderne
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 4039
File: apps/webapp/app/routes/invite-revoke.tsx:0-0
Timestamp: 2026-06-25T18:21:51.905Z
Learning: During the Zod v4 migration in the triggerdotdev/trigger.dev webapp, ensure any imports from `conform-to/zod` use the Zod-4 subpath: `conform-to/zod/v4` (e.g., `import { parseWithZod } from "conform-to/zod/v4"`). Do not import from the package root `conform-to/zod`, because it is the Zod 3 implementation and may load Zod-3-only symbols (e.g., `ZodBranded`, `ZodEffects`), which can throw at module load (notably with `zod4.4.3`). This should be enforced across `apps/webapp/**/*` where helpers like `parseWithZod` and `conformZodMessage` are used.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-07-03T17:10:21.498Z
Learnt from: 0ski
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 4148
File: apps/webapp/app/models/orgMember.server.ts:149-168
Timestamp: 2026-07-03T17:10:21.498Z
Learning: In triggerdotdev/trigger.dev, `User.email` (Prisma schema: `internal-packages/database/prisma/schema.prisma`) currently does NOT use `citext` and does NOT have a `lower(email)` functional unique index. Therefore, do not introduce Prisma queries like `where: { email: { equals: <value>, mode: "insensitive" } }` (or any case-insensitive lookup) against `User.email`, because it can force sequential scans of the `users` table under load. During review, ensure email is normalized (e.g., lowercased/trimmed) before both writes and subsequent lookups, and if true case-insensitive behavior/uniqueness is required, implement it via a separate app-wide migration (e.g., switch to `citext` and/or add a functional unique index with backfill) rather than bolting it onto individual feature PRs.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-04T18:16:35.386Z
Learnt from: nicktrn
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3836
File: apps/supervisor/src/backpressure/backpressureMonitor.ts:3-5
Timestamp: 2026-06-04T18:16:35.386Z
Learning: When reviewing TypeScript in this repo, apply the rule “prefer type aliases over interfaces” only to data/object shapes and union/intersection type modeling. If an interface is being used as a behavioral contract for collaborators to implement (e.g., method-shape interfaces that define required behavior, such as `BackpressureLogger` / `BackpressureSignalSource` in `apps/supervisor/src/backpressure/backpressureMonitor.ts`), keep it as an `interface` and do not flag it as a type-alias-vs-interface violation.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-09T17:58:04.699Z
Learnt from: 0ski
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 3879
File: apps/webapp/app/models/vercelIntegration.server.ts:619-630
Timestamp: 2026-06-09T17:58:04.699Z
Learning: In this codebase, outbound raw `fetch` calls should typically rely on Node/undici’s default request timeout (about ~300s) rather than adding a per-call `AbortController` + `setTimeout` wrapper inside individual functions (e.g. in files like `apps/webapp/app/models/vercelIntegration.server.ts`). During code review, do not flag the absence of a per-call timeout on a single `fetch` as an issue; if per-call timeouts are needed, they should be implemented via a codebase-wide convention (e.g., a shared fetch wrapper or documented pattern) rather than ad-hoc per-function changes.
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
📚 Learning: 2026-06-21T05:35:23.468Z
Learnt from: ericallam
Repo: triggerdotdev/trigger.dev PR: 4005
File: apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiErrorListPresenter.server.ts:29-30
Timestamp: 2026-06-21T05:35:23.468Z
Learning: For triggerdotdev/trigger.dev list endpoints (and their presenters/handlers that implement list pagination), it is an established shared convention to allow both cursor query params `page[after]` and `page[before]` to be provided at the same time. When both are present, `page[before]` must take precedence (i.e., it should be used/wins). During code review, do NOT flag missing per-endpoint mutual-exclusion validation between `page[after]` and `page[before]` as a problem; if stricter enforcement is ever desired, it should be implemented as a codebase-wide shared convention (not individually per endpoint).
Applied to files:
apps/webapp/app/presenters/v3/ApiRetrieveRunPresenter.server.ts
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🔴 One batch endpoint still lets a narrowly-scoped key attach batches to runs it cannot touch
The batch endpoint that accepts a list of items is never checked against the caller's permission for the parent run it names (no canWriteParentRun call in apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.tasks.batch.ts:43-45), so a credential limited to specific tasks can still attach its batch to any run in the environment.
Impact: A restricted key can link work to runs it is not allowed to modify, letting it influence those runs' completion behaviour.
Incomplete rollout of the parent-run permission check across the batch/trigger routes
This PR adds a parent-run permission check to every other write path that accepts a parent run:
apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.tasks.$taskId.trigger.ts:81-90(body.options?.parentRunId)apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.tasks.$taskId.batch.ts:61-76(per-itemitem.options?.parentRunId)apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v2.tasks.batch.ts:55-64(body.parentRunId)apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v3.batches.ts:72-81(body.parentRunId)
api.v1.tasks.batch.ts (the V2 body endpoint) was not updated, even though BatchTriggerTaskV2RequestBody carries both a top-level parentRunId and per-item options.parentRunId (packages/core/src/v3/schemas/api.ts:364-373 and the shared BatchTriggerTaskItem options). Its route-level authorization only verifies batchTrigger on the item task identifiers, so nothing constrains the parent run.
Relatedly, the two routes that were updated only check one of the two places a parent run can appear: api.v2.tasks.batch.ts / api.v3.batches.ts validate the top-level parentRunId but not per-item options.parentRunId, and api.v1.tasks.$taskId.batch.ts validates per-item ids only. The check should be applied uniformly to every parent-run id reachable from the request body.
(Refers to lines 43-45)
Prompt for agents
The PR introduces `canWriteParentRun` (apps/webapp/app/utils/parentRunAuthorization.server.ts) and applies it to api.v1.tasks.$taskId.trigger.ts, api.v1.tasks.$taskId.batch.ts, api.v2.tasks.batch.ts and api.v3.batches.ts, so a task-scoped (restricted) credential cannot attach new work to a parent run it has no write grant for. apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.tasks.batch.ts (the V2 batch endpoint, body schema BatchTriggerTaskV2RequestBody) was missed: it neither checks the body-level `parentRunId` nor the per-item `options.parentRunId`, and its handler does not even receive `ability` from the route builder. Additionally, the routes that were updated only cover one of the two locations a parent run can be specified — api.v2.tasks.batch.ts and api.v3.batches.ts check only the top-level `parentRunId`, while api.v1.tasks.$taskId.batch.ts checks only per-item ids. Consider factoring a small helper that collects every distinct parent run id reachable from a request body (top-level plus per-item options) and authorizing all of them, then wiring it into all four batch/trigger routes so coverage is uniform. Keep the existing ordering constraint in api.v1.tasks.$taskId.batch.ts where the oversized-batch rejection runs before the per-parent lookups.
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| const now = new Date(); | ||
| const routesToAdditionalKey = isAdditionalApiKey(apiKey); | ||
| if (routesToAdditionalKey && !additionalApiKeyLookupEnabled()) { | ||
| return { ok: false, reason: "disabled" }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Fall back to keys that were revoked within the grace window | ||
| if (!environment) { | ||
| let rootEnvironment = routesToAdditionalKey | ||
| ? null | ||
| : await tx.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ | ||
| where: { | ||
| apiKey, | ||
| }, | ||
| include, | ||
| }); | ||
|
|
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| // Fall back to root keys that were rotated within the grace window. | ||
| if (!routesToAdditionalKey && !rootEnvironment) { | ||
| const revokedApiKey = await tx.revokedApiKey.findFirst({ | ||
| where: { | ||
| apiKey, | ||
| expiresAt: { gt: new Date() }, | ||
| expiresAt: { gt: now }, | ||
| }, | ||
| include: { | ||
| runtimeEnvironment: { include }, | ||
| }, | ||
| }); | ||
|
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| environment = revokedApiKey?.runtimeEnvironment ?? null; | ||
| rootEnvironment = revokedApiKey?.runtimeEnvironment ?? null; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| // Additional keys are host-owned credentials. Legacy routes cannot apply a | ||
| // scoped ability, so only an explicit full-access scope is accepted. | ||
| const match = routesToAdditionalKey | ||
| ? await tx.apiKey.findFirst({ | ||
| where: { | ||
| keyHash: hashApiKey(apiKey), | ||
| revokedAt: null, | ||
| OR: [{ expiresAt: null }, { expiresAt: { gt: now } }], | ||
| }, | ||
| select: { | ||
| id: true, | ||
| lastUsedAt: true, | ||
| scopes: true, | ||
| runtimeEnvironment: { include }, | ||
| }, | ||
| }) | ||
| : null; | ||
|
|
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| if (match && !scopesGrantFullAccess(match.scopes)) { | ||
| return { ok: false, reason: "restricted" }; | ||
| } | ||
|
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| const additionalApiKey = match ? { id: match.id, lastUsedAt: match.lastUsedAt } : null; | ||
| let environment = rootEnvironment ?? match?.runtimeEnvironment ?? null; | ||
|
|
||
| if (!environment) { | ||
| return null; | ||
| return { ok: false, reason: "not-found" }; | ||
| } | ||
|
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||
| if ( | ||
| additionalApiKey && | ||
| (!additionalApiKey.lastUsedAt || | ||
| additionalApiKey.lastUsedAt < new Date(now.getTime() - 300_000)) | ||
| ) { | ||
| try { | ||
| // Deliberately the primary `prisma`, not `tx`: `tx` defaults to the | ||
| // read replica (and may be a caller's transaction), and this last-used | ||
| // telemetry write must hit the writer. It's throttled to once every 5 | ||
| // minutes per key and best-effort — auth never fails if it can't record. | ||
| await prisma.apiKey.updateMany({ | ||
| where: { | ||
| id: additionalApiKey.id, | ||
| revokedAt: null, | ||
| OR: [{ expiresAt: null }, { expiresAt: { gt: now } }], | ||
| }, | ||
| data: { lastUsedAt: now }, | ||
| }); | ||
| } catch (error) { | ||
| logger.warn("Failed to update API key last-used timestamp", { | ||
| apiKeyId: additionalApiKey.id, | ||
| error, | ||
| }); | ||
| } | ||
| } |
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🔍 Additional-key resolution is now duplicated in two places that must stay in sync
resolveEnvironmentByApiKey here re-implements essentially the same credential resolution that BearerCredentialResolver.authenticate performs in internal-packages/rbac/src/bearerCredentials.ts:226-312: additional-key format routing, kill-switch skip, hash lookup with revokedAt/expiresAt filters, root-key grace window, the 5-minute throttled lastUsedAt write, and the PREVIEW/DEVELOPMENT branch pivot. The only intentional divergence is that this legacy copy rejects anything that isn't full-access (scopesGrantFullAccess). Any future change to key lifecycle semantics (e.g. new revocation column, different grace window, different branch routing) has to be applied twice or the two auth paths will disagree for the same credential. Worth a follow-up to have the legacy helper delegate to the shared resolver and simply reject subject.restricted.
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| // API-key callers already possess a valid environment credential. Reuse | ||
| // exactly what they presented instead of exchanging it for the root key. | ||
| const presentedApiKey = presentedApiKeyFromAuthentication(authenticationResult); | ||
|
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| const result: GetProjectEnvResponse = { | ||
| apiKey: environment.apiKey, | ||
| apiKey: presentedApiKey ?? environment.apiKey, |
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🔍 Grace-window rotated keys are echoed back to the CLI as the environment credential
presentedApiKey ?? environment.apiKey returns whatever the caller presented, which for a root key that has already been rotated is the old value still inside its RevokedApiKey grace window (asserted in apps/webapp/test/projectEnvironmentCredentialRoute.test.ts:88-109). The CLI persists this value locally, so a trigger dev/deploy bootstrap performed during a rotation window will store a credential that stops working when the grace window expires, whereas before this change the caller was handed the current key. The test encodes it as intentional, but the operational consequence (silently provisioning an expiring credential) may be worth revisiting — e.g. only echo the presented key when it is an additional key.
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Add a global, org-locked kill switch (additionalApiKeyLookupEnabled, default off) gating the additional environment API-key lookup, and bounded OTel auth telemetry (api_auth.attempts counter, api_auth.duration_ms histogram, api_auth.rollout_mode gauge) to watch the rollout. Attributes are closed enums only (resolver, credential_kind, result, lookup_path); no credentials, hashes, or tenant identifiers are recorded.
Revert authenticateApiKeyWithScope to rbac.authenticateAuthorizeBearer (the kill switch still applies via the rbac controller), and make the auth telemetry tolerate a missing resolution from test doubles. Also register the v3/apiKeys subpath in core's typesVersions for node10.
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Summary
Environment API keys backed by the additional-key table can authenticate API requests using their stored effective scopes. Revoked and expired keys are rejected, branch environments retain their existing routing behavior, and last-used timestamps are updated on a throttled best-effort basis.
Design
API route builders receive the resolved ability and reject restricted keys on routes without an authorization declaration. Existing deployment, environment variable, queue, run, task, batch, session, and waitpoint routes declare the resources they access.
Trigger and batch responses return server-signed public access tokens, so additional keys never need access to the environment signing secret. Root-key rotation also keeps public tokens valid for the existing grace window.
Feature notes
without an authorization declaration.
during their grace window.
permission for that run.
credential for per-item authorization.
complete task set remain fail closed.
Deployment notes
The schema migration must be present before this code is deployed. Because bearer resolution runs on every authenticated request, deploy the resolver with additional-key lookup disabled, verify root-key and public-token parity, then enable lookup before any additional keys can be issued.
The multi-task authorization tightening changes the result for narrowly scoped tokens that request tasks outside their grants. Observe would-deny results before enforcing that check. Request-idempotency keys are also newly isolated by environment and task, so a retry crossing the deployment boundary may execute once more before old cache entries expire.
Follow-ups
Add would-deny observability and an independent enforcement switch for multi-task authorization.Add an independent switch for server-issued batch tokens while root-key parity is verified.